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GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER AND CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE
Dr. Martin D. Carcieri*
[M]en [too often] take it upon themselves to begin the
process of repealing those general laws of humanity which
are there to give a hope of salvation to all who are in
distress, instead of leaving those laws in existence,
remembering that there may come a time when they, too,
will be in danger and will need their protection.1
“[N]o state has any authority under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational
opportunities among its citizens.”2
“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, . . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”3
State enactments, regulating the enjoyment of civil rights,
upon the basis of race, and cunningly devised to defeat
legitimate results of the war, under the pretence of
recognizing equality of rights, can have no other result than
to render permanent peace impossible, and to keep alive a
conflict of races, the continuance of which must do harm to
all concerned.4

_______________________________________________________
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee, Knoxville; J.D., Ph.D., University of
California, Hastings and Santa Barbara. Thanks to Dave Feldman, Franz Schubert, Eddie French, and
Dave Folz for their contributions to this project. Special thanks to Betsy Postow and John Davis, without
whose extended feedback this article would never have taken full shape. Any mistakes herein are mine
alone.
1
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 211 (Rex Warner, trans., Penguin Books 1954).
2
Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law vol. 49,
281 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., U. Publications of Am., Inc. 1975) (quoting the opening
argument of Robert L. Carter, attorney for petitioners in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(Dec. 9, 1952)) [hereinafter Landmark Briefs].
3
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
4
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560-61 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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“But because [men] are wicked, and do not observe [their] faith with you,
you also do not have to observe it with them.”5
Civil disobedience . . . is one of the stabilizing devices of a
constitutional system . . . . [U]sed with due restraint and
sound judgment [it] helps to maintain and strengthen just
institutions. By resisting injustice within the limits of
fidelity to law, it serves to inhibit departures from justice
and to correct them when they occur.
.

.

.

[I]f justified civil disobedience seems to threaten civic
concord, the responsibility falls not upon those who protest
but upon those whose abuse of authority and power justifies
such opposition. For to employ the coercive apparatus of
the state in order to maintain manifestly unjust institutions
is itself a form of illegitimate force that men in due course
have a right to resist.6
I.

INTRODUCTION

Two thousand-four marked the 50th anniversary of Brown v. Board
of Education7 and the 40th anniversary of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.8 Since
then, American race law has transformed. Grutter v. Bollinger,9 the
landmark 2003 Supreme Court ruling upholding race preferences in
admissions at the University of Michigan (“UM”) Law School, was a major
step in this transformation. This article will probe Grutter’s ethical
implications for those in my line of work.
In Section II, to provide essential context, I introduce myself, some
people I know, a premise I hold, and an influential article. In Section III, I
introduce and evaluate the Grutter decision. Against this background, I
argue in Section IV that civil disobedience of a particular kind is a morally
justifiable response to the race discrimination allowed by Grutter. Using
Professor Kent Greenawalt’s analytical framework, I show that the

_______________________________________________________
5

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince 69 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. ed., U. of Chi. Press 1985).
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 383, 390-91 (Belknap Press 1971).
7
347 U.S. 483.
8
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-h (2000).
9
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6
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thousands who grade and/or write reference letters for law school applicants
each year are morally permitted to distort their assessments, based on race,
in order to offset the racial discrimination practiced at institutions like UM.
While I explain why I have no plans to engage in such conduct, I conclude
that if U.S. race relations are to continue their improvement since Brown, it
will be not because of, but rather in spite of, practices like those at UM.
II.
A.

THE NARRATIVE: ESSENTIAL CONTEXT

My Generation

I was born in 1956, two years after the Brown decision. I was seven
and my parents were in their late twenties when the 1964 Civil Rights Act
was enacted. Though neither had attended a day of college, my parents
were half a generation older than the first baby boomers, and so were well
situated to absorb and consciously transmit, by words and example, the
emerging cultural zeitgeist of racial nondiscrimination. Along with my
school and church community, they taught me that race discrimination—
judging or holding individuals back based on race—is just wrong. Race is
not only beyond anyone’s control, I was shown, but it determines neither
intelligence, character, nor ability, and is thus morally irrelevant to how we
should be treated.
Accordingly, I firmly believe that the racial
nondiscrimination norm expressly provided by the 1964 Civil Rights Act is
a just rule that should be faithfully followed. Title VI of the Act is
particularly important since it denies federal funds to, and thus the U.S.
government’s imprimatur upon, those institutions that engage in racial
discrimination.
This denial is especially crucial where the institution
seeking the funds is itself a governmental institution, like the UM Law
School.10
As an adult, I practiced law for a time before deciding that I prefer
teaching. I thus went back for a degree in Political Science, and have now
taught Public Law and Political Theory for many years, assigning course
grades to over one hundred students annually. In this capacity I have found
every degree of character, intelligence, motivation, and talent in both
genders and in every race and ethnicity with which I have worked. Beyond

_______________________________________________________
10
Given the stature and clarity of the 1964 Act, one might have thought that the legitimacy of the ban on
racial discrimination by federally supported institutions, especially state institutions, was as finally
settled as questions like women’s suffrage and prohibition of alcohol. See U.S. Const. amend. XIX, XXI.
This is apparently not so, however, so let me concede that at the margins, in truly exceptional cases that
can arise in domains of state action like law enforcement, corrections, and the military (i.e., those
bordering the Hobbesian state of nature, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 183-201 (C.B. MacPherson ed.,
Penguin Books 1968)), lower federal court rulings upholding race classifications in such domains are
defensible. See e.g. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996); Reynolds v. City of Chi., 296 F.3d
524 (7th Cir. 2002); see generally Martin Carcieri, Operational Need, Political Reality, and Liberal
Democracy: Two Suggested Amendments to Proposition 209-based Reforms, 9 Seton Hall Const. L.J.
459, 466-76 (1999). I shall return to this point.
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what I was taught as a child, long professional experience has firmly
reinforced for me the legitimacy of the racial nondiscrimination principle:
race is no basis on which to judge people.
Not surprisingly, many of my undergraduate and graduate students
are at least thinking about law school,11 and many who excel ask me for
reference letters to support their law school applications.12 As suggested, I
consider myself obliged not only to grade these students based on individual
merit regardless of race, but also to use any skills I have to write honest but
supportive law school references for deserving students who ask. To
illustrate, let me introduce three students with whom I have worked in the
last two years.
B.

The Students

The first student I shall call John. I met John when he took
Administrative Law with me. At that point, he had taken only one related
course, a general introduction to American law. By contrast, many students
in the class had the considerable advantage that they had already taken
Judicial Process and/or Constitutional Law I and/or II. Moreover, we used a
law school casebook, with complex judicial opinions at both the federal and
state levels in such areas as Administrative Due Process, the Nondelegation
Doctrine, the Legislative Veto, and the Appointments Clause.13
Nonetheless, John earned a B+ in the class, situating him in the top eight of
forty-eight students.14 The reason, in short, was that John has both a knack
for going to the heart of a legal issue and an exceptional, intuitive feel for
the mechanics of constitutional and policy analysis. This became even
clearer when he took Constitutional Law with me the next semester. While
his writing ability still only allowed a B+ in the course, John worked very
hard, to great effect, to develop his mastery of the structure and process
dimensions of Constitutional Law. It was a pleasure to watch this young
man find himself in something he loves, for which he has talent, and which,
now that he is at a flagship public law school, will apparently be his life’s
work.
I shall call the second student Amy. Amy took American Political
Thought and Constitutional Law I with me. She earned a C+ in both
courses, situating her roughly in the middle of both. Amy’s class

_______________________________________________________
11

For this reason, I feel obliged to teach such classes mostly as I have taught law school courses, with
Socratic method, required case briefs, and hypothetical essay exams. In this way, I find that students
gain some sense of the difficulty of law school, of the transformation it will demand of them, and so are
better able to decide whether it is the right path for them.
12
I have written about 150 such letters to date.
13
See Michael Asimow & Arthur Earl Bonfield, State and Federal Administrative Law (2d ed., West
1998).
14
The University of Tennessee (“UT”) does not allow minus grades. If it did, John would probably have
earned A-’s.
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participation and in-class writing skills were relatively weak, and the latter
never really improved compared to those of other students during the two
courses.
At the same time, Amy improved from a C on the midterm to a B on
the term paper in American Political Thought. To me, this suggested her
potential to write well within a time frame more typical of law practice.
Moreover, her in-class participation improved from a C- in American
Political Thought to a B- in Constitutional Law I. Finally, the pop quiz
portion of her grade improved from a C in the first course to a B in the
second. To me, this alone showed determination and the habits needed to
hit the ground running in law school.
The third student, whom I shall call Mike, is a thirty-five year old
married father of two. Mike served four years in the armed forces and has
been a local police officer for the last five years. Administrative Law was
Mike’s first class with me, and since his writing skills were not strong, his
course grade was a C+. By the time he took American Political Thought
with me the next semester, however, the smaller class size enabled me to see
clearly that like many older students, Mike is a grownup. Notwithstanding a
full time job and family obligations, he was always prepared and rarely
absent.15 As a result, Mike’s class participation and quiz grades were among
the top of the class. While his writing skills remained weak, they had
noticeably improved since Administrative Law. As the class progressed, I
thus expected Mike’s course grade to improve to a B or B+.
I was wrong. He earned an A. Here is how.
American Political Thought at UT is an upper division, writingemphasis course. To gauge students’ overall writing proficiency most
accurately, I base the written portion of the course grade on two exercises:
1) an in-class essay midterm exam and 2) a term paper. As a result, I
learned that when Mike has a few weeks to write a term paper rather than an
hour for an in-class exam, he can do astonishing work. In this case it was an
analysis of the twenty-first century implications of select works of Frederick
Douglass and Abraham Lincoln. While lingering technical writing
problems precluded an A, the depth and quality of Mike’s term paper were
among the best two or three of forty-five in the class. It thus earned an A-,
yet when I factored this together with the other performance measures, Mike
was still slightly closer to a B+ than to an A. Nonetheless, given his
momentum by the end of the class, I assigned the only course grade I fairly
could to any student who had performed as he had, an A. In my experience,

_______________________________________________________
15

When Mike was absent, it was always for official business such as special training or court testimony.
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so dramatic an improvement in a single semester is quite rare.16
C.

Race Relations

Three things are noteworthy about John, Amy, and Mike. First, like
most college students with whom I have worked, all three expressed
generally liberal ideas. By the end of a year of Constitutional Law,
however, Mike had evolved a sophisticated blend of liberal, conservative,
and libertarian views.
Second, while none of the three is an outstanding writer, I know that
a good law school will develop their writing skills. Given their strengths,
then, I feel well justified using whatever ability I have to present them
honestly but positively. In the recommendation letters I have written for all
three,17 I have described them exactly as I have above.18
Third, the stories I have told could approximately describe many
non-minorities with whom I have worked over the years. John, Amy, and
Mike, however, are all African Americans, and this brings us to a key
premise I hold: in just two generations, U.S. race relations have greatly
improved in several ways. As one commentator summed up a 1997 Gallup
Poll on black/white relations in the U.S.:
overall, [the numbers] show fewer race problems, less
discrimination, more opportunity for African Americans
and diminishing personal prejudice.
These attitudes
represent a significant change over 30 years, a
comparatively short time when measuring important
changes in behavior and belief. On the other hand,
significant race problems, everyday incidences of
discrimination, inequality of opportunity and prejudice
against blacks remain. Despite the persistence of these
attitudes, however, black satisfaction levels have risen
steadily over the years.19

_______________________________________________________
16
Since earning that A, Mike has taken a year of Constitutional Law with me. Though his class
participation has been outstanding throughout, his in-class writing skills the first semester still limited his
course grade to a B+. With persistent effort, however, Mike’s writing finally improved sufficiently in the
second semester that, together with the towering quality of his class participation (and quizzes), he
earned a course grade of A. A terrific story got even better.
17
Both as a gesture of good faith on my part and to provide students valuable support for other near term
opportunities, I always provide them copies of the law school reference letters I write for them.
18
As it happens, John is a bit shy and self-effacing. At the last possible moment, I followed a hunch that
has proven accurate in the past with some students, mostly women, who had done well with me but who
were too shy to ask: I offered to write him a reference for law school, and he immediately accepted.
19
Charlotte Astor, Gallup Poll: Progress in Black/White Relations, But Race is Still an Issue, 2 USIA
Elec. J. 3 (Aug. 1997), http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/itsv/0897/ijse/gallup.htm (accessed Jan. 27,
2006).
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In 2004, reinforcing these findings, “Gallup conducted its largest
and most comprehensive race-relations survey of blacks, Hispanics, and
whites to date. . . .”20 “[While] there were vast gulfs between different
groups’ perceptions of how minorities are treated today,”21 “[the] survey
found astounding progress in two areas that hit close to home for most
Americans: interracial relationships and the neighborhoods we live in.
Eighty-six percent of blacks, 79 percent of Hispanics, and 66 percent of
whites said they would not object to a child or grandchild marrying someone
of another race. Further buttressing the idea that different races are
increasingly comfortable living together was the finding that a majority of
Americans prefer to live in mixed neighborhoods.”22
These are mixed reviews, to be sure, and no one seriously contends
that racism in our society by any group has vanished; we can certainly
imagine better race relations. As my stories suggest and the Gallup Polls
show, however, race relations could be far worse. There is undeniably much
ground to lose.
Nonetheless, some speak as though there has simply been no real
change in forty or fifty years. As Richard Delgado has written, critical race
theory “begins with a number of basic insights. One is that racism is
normal, not aberrant, in American society.”23 This claim, it will be noticed,
is neither qualified nor stated as an opinion. It is an insight, i.e., a simple

_______________________________________________________
20
Inst. for Global Ethics, Research Report: New Survey Finds Improving Race Relations in the U.S., 7
Ethics Newsline (Apr. 12, 2004), http://www.globalethics.org/newsline/members/
issue.tmpl?articleid=04120417421179 (accessed Jan. 27, 2006) [hereinafter IGE Research Report].
21
Id.
22
Id. As Wade Henderson has observed of the 2004 Gallup poll, “[t]he good news is there is a sense of
optimism in the respondents to the poll. There is a real sense that America has changed for the better.”
Chaka Ferguson, Americans Say Race Relations are Improving, Ventura County Star 16 (Apr. 9, 2004).
As a prominent Grutter proponent thus concedes, “race relations have plainly improved.” Nicholas
Lemann, Ideas & Trends: Beyond Bakke; A Decision Universities Can Relate To, N.Y. Times D14 (June
29, 2003).
23
Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge xiv (Richard Delgado ed., Temple U. Press 1995). As Brooks
adds, “the central assumption of [critical race theory] is . . . that American society and its institutions . . .
are fundamentally racist, and that racism is not a deviation from the normal operation of American
society.” Roy Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal Pleading,
11 Harv. BlackLetter J. 85, 90 (1994). In Lawrence’s words, “[t]o the extent that [the American] cultural
belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists.” Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 322 (1987) (emphasis added).
See also Kate Stenvig, BAMN—University of Michigan Chapter,
http://www.umich.edu/~bamn/ (accessed Jan. 20, 2006); Girardeau Spann, Constitutionalizing and
Defining Racial Equality: The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 Const. Commentary 221 (2004).
Accordingly, Justice O’Connor’s observation that “race unfortunately still matters,” Grutter, 539 U.S. at
333, is of little guidance. When and how will we know that race no longer matters? The 2004 Gallup
Poll found that “[s]ixty-three percent of respondents thought that ‘race relations will always be a problem
in the U.S.’” IGE Research Report, supra n. 22. If Title VI’s plain command can not be enforced until
we are certain that race no longer matters, then Justice O’Connor had no business “expect[ing] that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved
today.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
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fact, beyond which it is unnecessary to inquire. Regardless of the
distinctions of kind and degree that characterize all social relations, racism
simply is, and time has changed nothing. Within this boldly illiberal
ideology,24 there has simply been no racial progress to speak of since
Brown. Stories like those I have shared, in which influential non-minorities
genuinely support and mentor the minorities they are entrusted to judge,
even in the twenty-first century, are false by definition.25 This view, I
submit, is indefensible, even destructive,26 and those who share it render
themselves irrelevant to constructive legal or policy dialogue.
D.

Butler’s Thesis

Some critics, however, offer a more subtle and sophisticated
analysis. Professor Paul Butler provides one that is useful for our
purposes.27 Beginning with a description of some of his early experiences
as a federal prosecutor, he writes:
While at the U.S. Attorney’s office, I made two discoveries
that profoundly changed the way I viewed my work as a
prosecutor and my responsibilities as a black person. The
first discovery occurred during a training session for new
Assistants conducted by experienced prosecutors. We
rookies were informed that we would lose many of our
cases, despite having persuaded a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was guilty. We would lose
because some black jurors would refuse to convict black
defendants who they knew were guilty. The second
discovery was related to the first, but was even more
unsettling. It occurred during the trial of Marion Barry,
then the second-term mayor of the District of Columbia.
Barry was being prosecuted by my office for drug
possession and perjury. I learned, to my surprise, that some
of my fellow African-American prosecutors hoped that the

_______________________________________________________
24

See generally Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, supra n. 23, at ch. 1. To the extent that those
taking this position still refer to themselves as liberals, Sleeper observes that “[l]iberals have defaulted . .
. partly because they have lost touch with, and faith in, civil society . . . . The early civil rights movement
knew better. It won what most Americans recognized as justice by affirming that even a flawed civil
society should be embraced and redeemed, not deconstructed and micromanaged as inherently, eternally
racist.” Jim Sleeper, Liberal Racism 10 (Penguin Group 1997).
25
On this mindset, see Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism ch. 10 (World Publg. Co. 1951).
26
In passing, critical race theorists’ sweeping generalizations provide those in my position an extra
justification for doing as UM does: if the truth is simply that our society is racist, and distinctions of kind
and degree and change over time are ignored, then what incentive is there to do the right thing? If we are
all simply racists, we might as well all act as the critical race theory authoritatively declares that we all
always act anyway.
27
Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale
L.J. 677 (1995).
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mayor would be acquitted, despite the fact that he was
obviously guilty of at least one of the charges - he had
smoked cocaine on FBI videotape. These black prosecutors
wanted their office to lose its case because they believed
that the prosecution of Barry was racist.
.

.

.

As such reactions suggest, lawyers and judges increasingly
perceive that some African-American jurors vote to acquit
black defendants for racial reasons.28
Upon this empirical basis, Butler proceeds to normative inquiry. In
his essay, he “examines the question of what role race should play in black
jurors’ decisions to acquit defendants in criminal cases.”29 Given the
injustices to blacks in this country, and in particular those afflicted by the
criminal justice system,30 Butler urges black jurors in criminal trials of black
defendants to have at their disposal an old tool of substantive justice: the
power of jury nullification.31 Even where jurors conclude that the defendant
is guilty of the crime charged, “the race of a black defendant is sometimes a
legally and morally appropriate factor for jurors to consider in reaching a
verdict of not guilty or for an individual juror to consider in refusing to vote
for conviction.”32 Butler continues:
My thesis is that, for pragmatic and political reasons, the
black community is better off when some nonviolent
lawbreakers remain in the community rather than go to
prison. The decision as to what kind of conduct by AfricanAmericans ought to be punished is better made by AfricanAmericans themselves, based on the costs and benefits to
their community, than by the traditional criminal justice
process, which is controlled by white lawmakers and white
law enforcers. Legally, the doctrine of jury nullification
gives the power to make this decision to African-American
jurors who sit in judgment of African-American defendants.

_______________________________________________________
28

Id. at 678-79.
Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
See id. at 690-93.
31
“Jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits a defendant who it believes is guilty of the crime with
which he is charged. In finding the defendant not guilty, the jury refuses to be bound by the facts of the
case or the judge’s instructions regarding the law. Instead, the jury votes its conscience.” Id. at 700
(emphasis added). See generally id. at 700-05.
32
Id. at 679.
29
30
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Considering the costs of law enforcement to the black
community and the failure of white lawmakers to devise
significant nonincarcerative responses to black antisocial
conduct, it is the moral responsibility of black jurors to
emancipate some guilty black outlaws.33
Butler takes care to provide a “principled structure”34 for black
jurors’ votes in such cases, advising presumptions for or against nullification
depending on whether the crime is violent rather than nonviolent, and
malum in se rather than malum prohibitum.35 He thus argues for an infusion
of equity36 into the criminal justice process. While a prosecutor does not
seek an equitable remedy per se, Butler describes his call for jury
nullification in some criminal cases as rough justice.37 He advocates “civil
disobedience,”38 which tempers the rule of law with considerations of
particular justice. Moreover, Butler claims, his thesis promotes utility:39 the
black community’s interests are best advanced both by keeping the more
dangerous guilty black defendants out of the community and the less
dangerous within the community, where they can do the most good.
This is a powerful argument for racial discrimination by state
agents, yet it raises troubling ethical implications for those in my position.

_______________________________________________________
33
34
35

Id.
Id. at 723; see also id. at 705, 715.
In cases involving violent malum in se crimes like murder, rape and assault, jurors
should consider the case strictly on the evidence presented, and, if they have no
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, they should convict. For nonviolent
malum in se crimes such as theft or perjury, nullification is an option that the juror
should consider, although there should be no presumption in favor of it. A juror
might vote for acquittal, for example, when a poor woman steals from Tiffany’s,
but not when the same woman steals from her next-door neighbor. Finally, in
cases involving nonviolent, malum prohibitum offenses, including “victimless”
crimes like narcotics offenses, there should be a presumption in favor of
nullification.

Id. at 715.
36
Black’s defines equity as “justice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly
formulated rules of common law.” Black’s Law Dictionary 484 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 5th ed. West
1979). A well-developed conception of equity can be found as early as Aristotle. See Aristotle,
Rhetoric, in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics 19, 80-81 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Random House 1954).
37
Butler, supra n. 27, at 725.
38
Id. at 708.
39
Id. at 716, 718-19. See generally Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation ch. 1 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970); Rawls, supra n. 6, at ch. 5.
Moreover, given the insanity of major aspects of the drug war, including its disproportionate impact on
racial minorities, Butler’s thesis is especially persuasive in such cases. Butler, supra n. 27, at 695.
Indeed, for an array of reasons, any juror in a criminal trial of an adult for the private cultivation of
marijuana solely for his private, personal use, not sale or trade, would be not just permitted, but morally
obliged, to nullify. See Martin Carcieri, Ashcroft v. Raich: An Opening for Rational Drug Law Reform, 1
Tenn. J. L. & Pol’y ___ (forthcoming Spring 2006).
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We are, it will be noticed, comparably situated to the representative40 juror
targeted by Butler. We are all state actors with some influence over the
allocation of valuable public resources. To be sure, there are limits to that
influence. Just as the juror’s decision to nullify may or may not yield
acquittal,41 the grade I assign or letter I write will often not be decisive in a
student’s admission to a prominent law school. Many factors will go into
that decision. At the same time, the way the juror and I use our power as
state actors, especially in close cases, can sometimes make all the difference
in an individual defendant’s or applicant’s life.42 It can determine whether
he obtains something he does not have but rationally wants very much, i.e.,
an acquittal or an admission. Like the juror, moreover, I can operate
undetected, under the radar, under a shroud of secrecy.43 Butler notes the
Supreme Court’s concession that “as a matter of law, a judge could not
prevent jury nullification.”44 Likewise, those who would punish me for
exercising power in a way they disapprove of are impotent.45 Just as black
jurors “are in a unique position to act on their beliefs when they sit in
judgment of a black defendant,”46 I too am in a unique position to act on my
beliefs.
Though some reject Butler’s thesis,47 institutions like UM, which
have fought for race discrimination by state agents, cannot do so easily.48
Butler therefore shines a powerful light within which to examine the ethical
implications of Grutter, to which we now turn.
III.

THE RULING: GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER

_______________________________________________________
40

See Rawls, supra n. 6, at 64 (discussing the concept of a representative member of a class).
This could be so, for example, in states that do not require unanimity for criminal conviction. See e.g.
La. Code Civ. P. Ann. art. 1797 (2005); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 136.450 (2003).
42
Particularly where students fall into the middle pile of applications at a given law school, where their
LSAT and GPA are neither so high that they are automatically admitted nor so low that they are
automatically rejected, letters of reference can tip the balance. ABA-LSAC Official Guide to ABAApproved Law Schools 10 (Wendy Margolis, Andrew Arnone, & Rick L. Morgan eds., 2002 ed., L. Sch.
Admis. Council 2001); Joel Clark, Careers in Political Science 66 (N.Y.: Pearson Longman 2004). In
some cases, accordingly, members of law school admissions committees have called and asked me to
verify and/or expand on what I have written.
43
Accord Rawls, supra n. 6, at 152. Rawls’s two principles of justice are those a rational individual
would choose if his enemy had substantial control over some interests of great importance to him.
44
Butler, supra n. 27, at 704 (quoting Sparf v. U.S., 156 U.S. 51, 74 (1895)).
45
Unless I act recklessly, no one can possibly gather proof that I am distorting grades and
recommendations based on race. At the very least, teams of university counsel, constitutional scholars,
and political theorists would have to be assigned to attend all my classes and review all my exams,
grades, and reference letters. This seems unlikely, especially during times of state budget shortfalls.
46
Id. at 700.
47
I have used Butler’s article, in edited, anthologized form, in several of my Judicial Process classes
largely because it so thoroughly engages and disturbs so many students.
48
Indeed, given its commitment to racial discrimination, UM seems to be in a bind whether it rejects or
embraces Butler’s thesis. If it rejects it, it can hardly do so on the principle that race should not be used
to determine how the state treats individuals seeking valuable public resources. If it embraces it, it will
have a hard time convincing those in my position that we, unlike the jurors, should not also secretly
allocate the public power/resources under our control based on race for good reasons.
41
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Gratz v. Bollinger49 and Grutter v. Bollinger50 were landmark
opinions—this generation’s statement of the constitutional law of
affirmative action in public university admissions. In these cases, white
applicants rejected by UM’s undergraduate program and Law School,
respectively, challenged the university’s official policy of race preferences
in admissions under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.51 Through its policy, UM
sought to attain the purported educational benefits of having a diverse
student body by enrolling a “critical mass”52 of African Americans, Native
Americans, and Hispanics.53
While the undergraduate program
automatically awarded twenty out of a possible 150 points to all members of
the three groups,54 the Law School’s policy required its admissions officials
to evaluate each applicant based on several factors. These included the
applicant’s undergraduate grade point average, his LSAT score, and such
“soft variables”55 as his personal statement, his recommenders’ enthusiasm,
an essay describing how he would contribute to law school diversity, the
quality of his undergraduate institution, and the areas and difficulty of his
undergraduate course selection.56 While the policy neither expressly defined
diversity solely in terms of race or ethnicity, nor restricted the types of
diversity eligible for “substantial weight,”57 it asserted:
[A] commitment to racial and ethnic diversity with special
reference to the inclusion of students from groups which
have been historically discriminated against, like African
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans, who without
this commitment might not be represented in our student
body in meaningful numbers. . . . [They] are particularly
likely to have experiences and perspectives of special
importance to our mission.58

_______________________________________________________
49

539 U.S. 244 (2003). As Kirsanow observes, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter is the key ruling
in the two cases. See Peter Kirsanow, The Abominable Snow Job, Natl. Rev. Online (June 24, 2003),
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-kirsanow062403.asp (accessed Jan. 27, 2006). Since
Grutter alone discusses diversity and upholds UM’s race preferences, it, and not Gratz, will be our
primary focus.
50
539 U.S. 306.
51
The petitioner in Grutter also relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which grants all persons the same right as
white citizens to make and enforce contracts. Id. at 317. Since § 1981s prohibition against
discrimination has been held coextensive with that of the equal protection clause, Grutter did not focus
on § 1981.
52
Id. at 316 (quoting UM Law School’s policy).
53
Id.
54
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.
55
Id. at 315.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 316.
58
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 737 (6th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Grutter II] (quoting UM’s law
school admissions policy, Exhibit Four at trial). In Grutter, the district court held that the law school’s
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In deciding Gratz and Grutter, the Court revisited the issue
presented twenty-five years earlier in Regents of University of California v.
Bakke.59 In Bakke, the University of California Davis Medical School
(“Davis”) had set aside sixteen of the one hundred seats in its annual
entering class solely for members of four racial groups: African Americans,
Asians, Hispanics, and Native Americans.60 Alan Bakke, a rejected white
applicant, challenged Davis’s practice on equal protection grounds. In the
controlling opinion for a divided Court, Justice Lewis Powell held that while
racial quotas are unconstitutional, public universities may, in order to
advance student body diversity,61 use race as a factor to “tip the balance in
[an applicant’s] favor”62 in the admissions process. Relying on Bakke,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist held for a six to three majority in Gratz that
UM’s undergraduate preferences were too mechanical to satisfy equal
protection.63 In Grutter, by contrast, also claiming to rely on Bakke,64
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor held for a five to four majority that the
promotion of student body diversity is a compelling state interest that may
be advanced by the kind and degree of race preferences used by UM’s law
school.65
On the one hand, Justice O’Connor’s ruling was not surprising. For
one thing, she greatly admired Justice Powell, the great centrist who had
authored Bakke’s controlling opinion. For another, she is an incrementalist,
having often occupied the Court’s moderate bloc in key cases.66 Beyond
this, Justice O’Connor tipped her hand a bit at oral argument. Early on, she
cornered the lawyer for the parties challenging the UM plans, reminding
him that the Court had allowed race based differential treatment by
government in some contexts.67 It was thus somewhat predictable that
race preferences violated the Fourteenth Amendment, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) [hereinafter Grutter I], but a closely divided Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
Grutter II, 288 F.3d at 735. In Gratz, the district court upheld the undergraduate point system, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) and since Gratz’s appeal had not been heard by the
time the Supreme Court granted review, the two cases were consolidated and heard together by the High
Court.
59
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
60
See id. at 277-78 n. 7 (discussing the magnitude of the difference that race made in the Davis
program).
61
Id. at 311-14.
62
Id. at 316.
63
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-72.
64
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325. Justice Anthony Kennedy also claimed that Bakke controlled in Grutter and
so it is important to be clear that six of the nine Justices agreed, at least nominally, on this crucial point.
Id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting),
65
Id. at 328, 340 (majority). According to Justice O’Connor, UM violated neither Title VI nor the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 343.
66
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Rehnquist Revolution, New Republic 32, 36 (Dec. 27, 2004). In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), for example, Justice O’Connor forged a moderate bloc to
uphold the core of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which had expanded the constitutional right of
privacy to include a limited right to obtain an abortion.
67
Oral Argument Transcr. at 5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Apr. 1, 2003) (available at
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/02-241.pdf (accessed Jan. 27, 2006))
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Justice O’Connor would rule at least partly for UM.
On the other hand, as some have observed, Grutter was surprising.68
Indeed, given the substance and clarity of Justice O’Connor’s opinions in
other major affirmative action cases,69 one would never guess that she had
written Grutter. Though she had not yet joined the Court when it decided
Bakke, Justice O’Connor has firmly rejected the diversity rationale in other
challenges to the race-based allocation of scarce, valuable public
resources.70
Whether or not Grutter was surprising, however, I submit that its
legitimacy and stability are highly doubtful for at least two reasons. First, at
the statutory level, Grutter flatly contradicts the express terms of Title VI.
Grutter allows UM to discriminate based on race, yet Title VI plainly
provides that so long as an institution accepts federal support, as all U.S. law
schools do, it may not so discriminate. Thus, until Congress repeals Title VI
as bad policy, Grutter inescapably conflicts with the explicit command of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.71

[hereinafter Grutter Oral Argument].
68
See Michael Klarman, Are Landmark Court Decisions all that Important? Chron. Rev. 10 (Aug. 8,
2003).
69
See e.g. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (in which Justice O’Connor drew a hard
but clear line in elucidating the standing doctrine despite conceding the importance of the racial issue);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (in which Justice O’Connor was not shy about calling a racially
gerrymandered legislative district exactly what it was).
70
As she wrote in dissent in Metro Broadcasting, for example, “[m]odern equal protection doctrine has
recognized only one [compelling state] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination. The
interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest. It is
simply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing racial
classifications.” 497 U.S. at 612 (O’Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
Though one can plausibly distinguish the admissions and broadcasting contexts, it was by no means
certain that Justice O’Connor would endorse diversity in the UM cases.
71
On using the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s express command of racial nondiscrimination as a stepping stone
for racial discrimination, see Martin Carcieri, The South Carolina Secession Statement of 1860 and the
One Florida Initiative: The Limits of a Historical Analogy and the Possibility of Racial Reconciliation,
13 St. Thomas L. Rev. 577, 600 (2001). It may be objected that Title VII cases like United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), allowed
race conscious measures by private and public entities. Those cases, however, presented narrow factual
situations involving specific, identified discrimination against blacks or women, and so do not remotely
parallel the Michigan cases. In Weber, only five of 273 skilled craftworkers were black, and so the
policy in dispute favored blacks alone. 443 U.S. at 198. In Johnson, likewise, zero of 238 road
dispatcher positions were filled by women. 480 U.S. at 621. Both cases thus relied solely on the
indisputably valid rationale of remedying identified discrimination, while in Grutter, UM relied solely on
the diversity rationale.
Justice Powell captured much of the source of the difficulty here in a single paragraph:
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of
contemporary history have been the same for at least a generation: discrimination
on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and
destructive of democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned, and we are told
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UM might reply that Bakke itself held that state action surviving
equal protection challenge comports with Title VI as a matter of law.72
Since Grutter held that the law school did not violate equal protection, UM
would continue, it has not violated Title VI. The fact remains, however, that
UM’s racial discrimination violates Title VI’s plain command of racial
nondiscrimination. The claim that statutory language allows what it plainly
forbids renders the written rule of law a sham, the consequences of which
we shall consider below.73
Even conceding UM’s point, however, this simply moves the
analysis back a step, bringing us to the second reason for Grutter’s dubious
legitimacy.
As a constitutional matter, prominent opinion
notwithstanding,74 the majority and concurring opinions in Grutter cut so
deeply and widely against the letter and spirit of Bakke75 that Grutter could
easily be reversed upon the next change of personnel at the Supreme
Court.76 The crux of the problem is that although Justice Powell had
that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is
gored. Those for whom racial equality was demanded are to be more equal than
others. Having found support in the Constitution for equality, they now claim
support for inequality under the same Constitution.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 n. 35 (quoting Alexander Bickel, The Morality of Consent 133 (Yale U. Press
1975)).
72
Id. at 287.
73
Moreover, lest we lose our bearings, it is also difficult to square Grutter with the proposition that “no
state has any authority under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a
factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens.” Landmark Briefs, supra n. 2, at 281
(quoting the opening argument of Robert L. Carter, attorney for petitioners in Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (Dec.
9, 1952)).
74
As one commentator wrote, “the court made it clear that it supported the position staked out by Justice
Lewis F. Powell in 1978.” Jacques Steinberg, The Supreme Court: University Admissions; An
Admissions Guide, N.Y. Times A1 (June 24, 2003). Lemann described the decision as “upholding the
Bakke standard.” Lemann, supra n. 22. As the editors of the Washington Post declared, the Court
“adopted the logic of . . . Bakke.” Reaffirmative Action, Wash. Post A20 (June 24, 2003). As the editors
of the New York Times proclaimed, “the Court reaffirmed Bakke and proceeded to use it as a template.”
A Win for Affirmative Action, N.Y. Times A30 (June 24, 2003). As Jeffrey Rosen opined, Justice
O’Connor “reaffirmed . . . Bakke . . . in unequivocal terms,” she “made clear that she and her colleagues
take the strictures of Bakke seriously.” Jeffrey Rosen, Light Footprint, New Republic 16 (July 7, 2003).
As Paula Johnson declared, “the Court in Grutter . . . left no doubt that it adopted Justice Powell’s pivotal
opinion in Bakke.” Paula Johnson, Jam Tomorrow and Jam Yesterday: Reflections on Grutter, Gratz,
and the Future of Affirmative Action, Jurist Online Symposium (Sept. 5, 2003),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-aa/johnson-printer.php (accessed Jan. 27, 2006). See also
Kenneth Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 60 (2004);
Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Justices; Context and the Court, N.Y. Times A1 (June 25,
2003).
75
Justice O’Connor’s departure is especially significant in light of her elaboration of the crucial
importance of stare decisis in Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 854-69, the landmark ruling upholding
the core of Roe, 410 U.S. 113. Since Grutter departs so significantly from Bakke, further, it is not at all
clear that Justice Powell would have held that UM Law School’s practices comport with Title VI, thus
rendering UM’s objection even weaker.
76
Jonathan Turley, A Ruling That Only Goldilocks Could Love, L.A. Times B15 (June 24, 2003). Given
the Senate’s resort to the filibuster over lower federal court nominees in recent years, see e.g. Miguel
Estrada Bows Out, N.Y. Times A18 (Sept. 5, 2003), and Warren Richey, How They’ll Reshape the
Bench, Christian Science Monitor (Oct. 12, 2004), I submit that the current state of American judicial
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expressly reaffirmed that all governmental racial classifications are subject
to strict scrutiny,77 Justice O’Connor simply abandoned strict scrutiny in
Grutter.78 This, in turn, led to all the other problems with the opinion, since
politics is such that only a principled centrist like Justice Powell could be confirmed to replace a lone
retiring member of the Grutter majority. See Martin Carcieri, Justice Lewis F. Powell, in Encyclopedia
of American Civil Rights and Liberties ___ (Otis H. Stephens, Jr., John M. Scheb II, & Kara E.
Stooksbury eds., Greenwood Press forthcoming 2006). If so, then for the reasons indicated, that new
Justice could easily agree that Grutter was an inexcusable departure from Bakke, and vote to overrule it.
In discussing this article with colleagues in various disciplines, I have been reminded of the
tendency by some non-lawyers to dismiss the importance of stare decisis, i.e., judicial fidelity to
precedent, without speaking to the implications of such a dismissal. If precedent is unimportant, after all,
then it is not just that these colleagues would have no basis to object if the Court simply ignored or
overruled a decision they favor, like Roe v. Wade, or even Brown itself. It is more fundamental than this,
for ultimately we would be rejecting common law method altogether. Lawyers would argue cases based
solely on constitutional and/or statutory text, and judges, rather than wasting time and paper writing
opinions, would indicate their rulings with a simple thumbs up or thumbs down. See generally Franz
Kafka, The Trial (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., Random House 1956).
As Strauss has thus written, “[n]early everyone . . . [in our legal culture] acknowledges that in
interpreting the Constitution, precedent counts for something.” David Strauss, What is Constitutional
Theory? 87 Cal. L. Rev. 581, 583 (1999). If the presumptive authority of relevant precedent is admitted,
then we are at the level at which courts actually grapple with the problem. In the recent landmark case of
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), for example, which overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), by striking down Texas’s antisodomy statute, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority that
stare decisis “is not . . . an inexorable command.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. However, he went on to
explain that “Bowers . . . has not induced detrimental reliance comparable to some instances where
recognized individual rights are involved.” Id. Since Grutter expands governmental power against the
individual rather than securing individual rights against government, the detrimental reliance criterion
should no more save Grutter than it did Bowers. Since Justice Kennedy both authored Lawrence and
dissented in Grutter, he would surely agree.
77
Strict scrutiny means that the State has an uphill battle, a presumption against its classification, with
respect to its ends as well as its means. As Justice Powell wrote, “[w]hen [political compromises] touch
upon an individual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden
he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The
Constitution[] guarantees that right to every person regardless of his background.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at
299 (emphasis added). Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor has reinforced this crucial holding. See
e.g. Richmond, 476 U.S. at 493-94; Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 222-24.
78
By deferring to the racial preferences of unelected educational experts who pay none of the costs of
those preferences, Justice O’Connor ripped deference out of the “unitary formulation” which Justice
Powell clearly established in Bakke, i.e., diversity and deference within the context and constraint of
strict scrutiny. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). As Justice Kennedy continued,
“[d]eference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it.
.

.

.

It is regrettable the Court’s . . . holding . . . is accompanied by a suspension of the strict scrutiny which
was the predicate of allowing race to be considered in the first place.” Id. at 394-95. See also Nat
Hentoff, Say Goodbye to Equal Protection; The ‘Smoking Gun’ in the Affirmative Action Victory, Wash.
Times A17 (July 14, 2003); Nat Hentoff, What the Supreme Court Left Out, Village Voice 34 (July 22,
2003); Nat Hentoff, Sandra Day O’Connor’s Elitist Decision, Village Voice 30 (July 29, 2003); Peter
Schuck, Reflections on Grutter, Jurist Online Symposium (Sept. 5, 2003),
http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum
/symposium-aa/schuck.php (accessed Jan. 27, 2006); Kirsanow, supra n. 49, at 3. Professor McGinnis
adds that “the court had in fact used the least invasive level of review and merely called it a different
name.” Adam Liptak, The Supreme Court: Legal Scholars; Affirmative Action Proponents Get the Nod
in a Split Decision, N.Y. Times A26 (June 24, 2003). Indeed, though the burden of satisfying strict
scrutiny was unquestionably that of respondent UM, Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsberg
simply referred to “petitioners’ ultimate burden of persuasion.” Gratz, 539 U.S. at 296 (Souter &
Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting). This is a stunning abandonment of strict scrutiny.
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she failed to apply the tests ordinarily applicable to the ends and means of
state action under strict scrutiny.
As for ends, to be sure, Justice Powell endorsed diversity in Bakke,
but said very little about it, and understandably so.79 Twenty-five years
later, a Court majority establishing diversity as a compelling interest for the
first time, one sufficient to justify overt racial categories in public education,
owed us a coherent theory of diversity.80 It owed us an account that justifies

_______________________________________________________
79
Justice Powell was well aware that he was single handedly launching a new theory based on a vague
term he never defined. Pragmatist that he was, he recognized that if the diversity rationale were to
survive, to command a future Court majority, it would need time to take root and grow. He thus gave it a
minimal treatment, to allow lower courts and scholars the opportunity to fill it out as new cases emerged
in coming years. Given his thorough rendering of the individualist principle, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 28999, Justice Powell certainly understood what it meant to provide a coherent, thorough, convincing
justification for a legal principle.
80
There are several reasons for this, though I shall limit myself to five. First, Justice O’Connor clearly
rejected the diversity rationale in Metro Broadcasting. 497 U.S. 602 (O’Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J.,
Scalia & Kennedy, J.J., concurring). As she wrote for four justices, “[t]he Constitution provides that the
government may not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race
or ethnicity determines how they act or think.

.

.

.

[T]he interest in diversity of viewpoints provides no legitimate, much less important, reason to employ
rac[ial] classifications apart from generalizations impermissibly equating race with thoughts and
behavior.” Id. at 602, 615. The broadcasting and admissions contexts are distinct, of course, but given
this language, Justice O’Connor owed us an explanation of how, in just thirteen years, race had come to
determine how people act or think after all.
Second, scholars and lower courts have long observed that diversity is a vague, malleable
term, crying out for definition. As Schuck has written:
Diversity, like equality, is an idea that is at once complex and empty until it is
given descriptive and normative content and context. Unfortunately, most
discussions of diversity and the diversity rationale for affirmative action do not
explain what it actually means, much less which groups with what kinds of
attributes create diversity-value. Nevertheless, the ways that affirmative action
programs are designed and defended leave little doubt that program advocates
almost always mean racial diversity, with little regard to the many anomalies,
evasions, and confusions that attend most race discourse in America.
Peter Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 1, 37 (2002). As
even Grutter supporter Dean Brest concedes, “many educators believe that diversity is educationally
valuable. But the evidence is impressionistic and the conclusions are speculative.” Paul Brest, Some
Comments on Grutter v. Bollinger, 51 Drake L. Rev. 683, 690 (2003). As for lower courts, see e.g.
Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 790-95 (1st Cir. 1998), Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public
Schools, 197 F.3d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1999), and Johnson v. University of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1250
(11th 2001). Indeed, the editors of the Harvard Law Review illustrated the Sixth Circuit’s utter lack of
clarity in Grutter itself. As they wrote:
What is diversity? One could read the entire set of Sixth Circuit opinions and
Bakke and be unable to distill a basic doctrinal formulation. . . . By failing to
recognize that both stages of affirmative action analysis require a comprehensible
notion of diversity, Grutter exacerbates the confusion surrounding Bakke and its
progeny. A workable definition of diversity is required not only to assess how
compelling the state’s interest in diversity really is, but also to perform narrow
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UM’s actual practices, that does not merely defer to the racial judgments of
unelected experts.81 Beyond the problems with the Court’s ends analysis, its
tailoring analysis. Without such a definition, it is impossible to distinguish quotas
meaningfully from “plus factors” or “critical masses.”
Recent Case: 6th Circuit Upholds Affirmative Action at the University of Michigan Law School, 116
Harv. L. Rev. 720, 725 (2002). “The Sixth Circuit’s inability to articulate a workable definition of
‘diversity’ under Bakke underscores the difficulty of the task facing the Supreme Court . . . .” Id. at 72021. As Kirsanow adds:
[u]ntil now, qualifying as a compelling state interest has been perhaps the most
difficult legal standard to meet in our nation’s jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the
Court simply credits the experts’ studies, reports and amici briefs from preference
proponents to summarily conclude that diversity is a compelling state interest
despite never precisely defining that interest.
Kirsanow, supra n. 49 (emphasis in original).
Third, it is telling that UM altered the definition of the diversity it allegedly sought as the
litigation proceeded. In its admissions policy, we saw that the Law School referred to the “experiences
and perspectives” of three racial groups. See Grutter II, 288 F.3d at 737. In its brief, however, having
apparently concluded that its claim of a Black or Hispanic viewpoint could not withstand close scrutiny,
UM narrowed its goal to diversity of experience. Br. of Respt.. at 24, Grutter, 539 U.S 306.
Notwithstanding this result-oriented refinement, Justice O’Connor simply referred in passing to “widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints,” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330, leaving the exact nature of the
diversity justifying preferences for just three races quite obscure.
Fourth, Justice Stephen Breyer’s proposed definition of diversity at oral argument, the only
real attempt at a working definition, was woefully inadequate. Ultimately siding with the majority,
Justice Breyer referred to “people who have grown up in America . . . [who] have probably, though not
certainly, shared the experience of being subject to certain stereotypical reactions from people throughout
their lives.” Oral Argument Transcr. at 23, Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (Apr. 1, 2003) (available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/02-516.pdf (accessed Jan. 27,
2006)) [hereinafter Gratz Oral Argument]. A moment’s reflection discloses the utter lack of fit between
this definition and UM’s actual practices. Justice Breyer’s definition plausibly includes Arab Americans,
Christian fundamentalists, and the exceptionally tall, short, thin, and obese. UM extends substantial
preferences only to three races, however, so its means are far too underinclusive to satisfy narrow
tailoring. I do not suggest that Justice Breyer thought he was providing a comprehensive theory at oral
argument, but the inadequacy of his working definition in light of UM’s actual practices shows again that
if the Court after twenty-five years were going to transform Justice Powell’s lone ruling into a majority
holding, it owed us a theory of diversity commensurate with recognizing an interest sufficiently
compelling to justify race-based differential treatment by government.
Finally, diversity presents a conceptual/interpretive problem in light of another unenumerated
constitutional value, the right of privacy. Both are liberal values, to be sure, but they have crucially
different functions in constitutional analysis. Privacy is a shield the individual can use against the
government, specifically as a fundamental right that, when burdened, triggers strict scrutiny. Diversity,
by contrast, is a weapon that the government uses against the individual who falls on the wrong side of a
racial classification. On this account alone, the Court owed us a legal theory appropriate to a majority
ruling embracing an unenumerated value in a way that makes Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), look tame by comparison.
I thus conclude that if diversity actually had the theoretical weight and coherence that a
compelling state interest properly demands, the Grutter majority should have produced a litany of joint
and concurring opinions demonstrating this, or at least showing the way.
81
It also owed us an account that does not reduce to the mere racial diversity that Justice Powell
expressly proscribed. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315. Given the Grutter Court’s deference, however, this
was not even attempted, nevermind provided. Justice Kennedy suggested a possible reason for this. As
he observed, UM Law School’s former Dean of Admissions:
explained the difficulties he encountered in defining racial groups entitled to
benefit under the School’s affirmative action policy. He testified that faculty
members were “breathtakingly cynical” in deciding who would qualify as a
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abandonment of strict scrutiny left its means analysis unconvincing as
well.82
Grutter thus twice abandons the well-settled rule of law. It
disregards the constitutional rule, forcefully reaffirmed in Bakke, of strict
scrutiny of all governmental racial classifications, and it undermines the
member of underrepresented minorities. An example he offered was faculty
debate as to whether Cubans should be counted as Hispanics: One professor
objected on the grounds that Cubans were Republicans. Many academics at other
law schools who are “affirmative action’s more forthright defenders readily
concede that diversity is merely the current rationale of convenience for a policy
that they prefer to justify on other grounds.”
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
If not diversity as Justice Powell defined it, what are these other grounds? The true goal
appears best characterized as proportional representation of the three groups based on the remedial and
compensatory/reparative rationales. See Martin Carcieri, The Sixth Circuit and Grutter v. Bollinger:
Diversity And Distortion, 7 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 127, 133-40 (2002); see also Anthony Kronman, Is
Diversity a Value in American Higher Education? 52 Fla. L. Rev. 861 (2000) (giving an example of an
admirable if not convincing theory of the diversity justifying the magnitude of preferences UM uses for
three races).
82
Though I shall expand my means argument below, perhaps the crux of the problem is that although
Justice Powell endorsed diversity in Bakke, he said nothing about critical mass, and the reason is clear:
for him that would unmistakably have denoted a de facto minimum and thus the quota he expressly held
unconstitutional. In reply to such an objection, Justice O’Connor wrote, “[r]ather, the Law School’s
concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to
produce.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. This vague assertion, it will be noted, simply changes the subject:
since UM’s racial discrimination is benevolently designed, its effects are irrelevant. On this point, key
exchanges at oral argument between UM’s lawyers and Justice Antonin Scalia and the Chief Justice are
especially telling. See Gratz Oral Argument, supra n. 80, at 28-29, 36; Grutter Oral Argument, supra n.
67, at 37. By accepting critical mass, Justice O’Connor flatly rejected Bakke by crossing the crucial line
from a liberal focus on process to a collectivist focus on outcome. Justice Kennedy underscored this
problem by noting that given the tension between critical mass and individualized treatment, UM
necessarily sacrifices the individual when it emphasizes critical mass. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388-93
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Even putting these problems aside, the Chief Justice demonstrates that in
practice UM only seeks a critical mass of African Americans, not the other groups. See id. at 380-83
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Grutter’s policy, legal, and constitutional implications are sprawling and as yet far from
completely clear. I shall limit myself to three possible lines of implication. First, if deference to the
racial preferences of unelected professionals within their area of expertise is now the law, then deference
to the judgment of police officials who conclude that racial profiling is rational law enforcement seems to
follow.
As for academic policy, secondly, Grutter appears to enable a public university dean to
impose floors on the course grades faculty may assign to students of select races. The dean might reason
that the academic dismissal of such minorities would undermine the university’s compelling interest in
diversity. If race may be used to determine who is admitted to selective public universities, she might
conclude, it may certainly be used to determine who stays in. If anything, race based differential
treatment is more justified in the latter case since the university has already invested in the minority
student.
As for state constitutional law and politics, finally, let us recognize that Grutter simply
allows, rather than requires, states to use race preferences in public university admissions. Accordingly,
the people of Michigan could, through legislation or constitutional amendment (as in California and
Washington State), make racial nondiscrimination the express policy of their law. The requisite number
of signatures to place the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative on the 2006 ballot have now been gathered,
Mark Hornbeck, Ballot Petitions Hit Goal; Opponents of Racial Preferences in Mich. Get Enough
Signatures to Make 2006 Vote, Detroit News 1B (Jan. 6, 2005), and polls indicate that Michigan voters
overwhelmingly disfavor UM’s racial discrimination. See Terry Kosdrosky, Business Execs Favor Ban
on Preferences; Poll: Majority Would Vote for Amendment, Crain’s Detroit Business 1 (June 6, 2005).
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statutory rule, expressly provided in Title VI, of racial nondiscrimination by
institutions accepting federal funds. While some might dismiss this as
simply one opinion among many, UM’s own admissions statistics show that
in 1995, the year Barbara Grutter applied to UM, applicants from the three
preferred races in the 3.25 to 3.5 GPA range and in the 156-158 LSAT range
had a fifteen out of eighteen, or eighty-three percent, chance of admission.83
By contrast, non-minority applicants in the 3.75 to 4.0 GPA range and in the
161 to 163 LSAT range had an eight out of ninety-three, or eight percent
chance of admission.84 Vast discrepancies, in other words, exist even across
four cells: even where non-minorities were four LSAT/GPA grids higher—
two up, two over—they still had only one-tenth the chance of admission. As
Sixth Circuit Judge Danny Boggs, dissenting in Grutter II, observed:
An examination of the admissions data shows that . . .
under-represented minorities with a high C to low B
undergraduate average are admitted at the same rate as
majority applicants with an A average with roughly the
same LSAT scores. Along a different axis, minority
applicants with an A average and an LSAT score down to
156 (the 70th percentile nationally) are admitted at roughly
the same rate as the majority applicants with an A average
and an LSAT score over 167 (the 96th percentile
nationally). The figures indicate that race is worth over one
full grade point of college average or at least an 11-point
and 20-percentile boost on the LSAT.
.

.

.

[As for] the comparison of the chances of admission for
applicants with the same academic credentials (at least
numerically) . . . [t]aking a middle-range applicant with an
LSAT score 164-66 and a GPA of 3.25-3.49, the chances of
admission for a white or Asian applicant are around 22
percent. For an under-represented minority applicant, the
chances of admission (100%) would be better called a
guarantee of admission.85

_______________________________________________________
83

See Br. of Pet. at 7, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (citing UM’s own figures).
Id.
85
Grutter II, 288 F.3d at 796-97 (Boggs, J., dissenting). As the statistician whose testimony District
Judge Bernard Friedman accepted had testified, “Native American, African American, Mexican
American, and Puerto Rican applicants in the same LSAT x GPA grid cell as a Caucasian American
applicant have odds of acceptance that is many, many (tens to hundreds) times that of a similarly situated
84
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THE DILEMMA: WHETHER TO ENGAGE IN CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

In view of this gap between what Grutter allows and Title VI
commands, we can now fully appreciate the ethical dilemma of those of us
comparably situated to the representative juror targeted by Butler: are we
morally permitted to distort students’ grades and reference letters based on
race in order to offset the discrimination at UM and like institutions either
by giving minority students less credit than they deserve, giving nonminority students more credit than they deserve, or both?
UM would surely oppose those in my position acting in this way. It
would assert that since I propose to act lawlessly,86 I have the burden of
justifying my contemplated action on moral grounds.87 It would insist that I

Caucasian American applicant.” Grutter I, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 837. As Judge Freidman thus found, “the
evidence indisputably demonstrates that the law school places a very heavy emphasis on an applicant’s
race in deciding whether to accept or reject.” Id. at 840. See also Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai,
Pervasive Preferences: Racial and Ethnic Discrimination in Undergraduate Admissions Across the
Nation, http://www.ceousa.org/
multi.html (accessed Jan. 29, 2006) (giving comparable statistics at other selective public universities).
As Kirsanow notes:
Despite the law school’s claim that race is only one factor among many and used
in a flexible fashion, the percentage of black, Hispanic, and Native American
applicants correlates so closely with the percentage of those admitted from such
groups that there can be no doubt that race is clearly the deciding factor in
admission.
Kirsanow, supra n. 49 (emphasis in original). Even prominent Grutter fan Jeffrey Rosen observes that
“given the magnitude of the score gaps between African Americans and Hispanic students and their
white and Asian counterparts, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that race is as decisive a factor for
admitting many of the minority law school applicants as it is for admitting the undergraduate
applicants.” Rosen, supra n. 74 (emphasis added). See also Schuck, supra n. 78, at 18-20.
Given the decisive role that membership in the favored races plays in UM law admissions, Justice
O’Connor’s claim of the value of “exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints,”
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330, leaves it unclear, especially under strict scrutiny, how three races have the
market so cornered on culture, ideas, and viewpoints that UM may single them out as the statistics show
that it does. Justice Kennedy’s skepticism that diversity is UM’s true rationale for singling these groups
out thus rings true.
For these reasons, a future judge could easily justify a vote to overturn Grutter as a clear
departure from Bakke, which the majority acknowledged as controlling precedent.
86
To be clear, though I would be violating Title VI, I would not be violating Grutter. Grutter is not
directed to those in my position, and it enables, rather than forbids, racial discrimination by state actors.
87
As Hall notes, where civil disobedience is contemplated, “a burden of proof may be placed upon the
agent to demonstrate the socially responsible nature of his action.” Robert T. Hall, The Morality of Civil
Disobedience 102 (Harper & Row 1971). See also Hugo Adam Bedau, Civil Disobedience: Theory and
Practice 55 (N.Y.: Pegasus 1971). As Bok adds, “[t]he test of publicity asks which lies, if any, would
survive the appeal for justification to reasonable persons.” Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public
and Private Life 93 (Pantheon Books 1978). While it is not unfair to call my contemplated action lying,
it is also not unfair to say the same of the actions of many institutions of higher learning in their attempts
to cover up what several Freedom of Information Act lawsuits uncovered in the 1990’s. See Martin
Carcieri, The Wages of Taking Bakke Seriously: Federal Judicial Oversight of the Public University
Admissions Process, 2001 BYU Educ. & L. J. 161, 170 (2001).
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have the burden to “persuade or obey.”88
This is a fair challenge, though I submit that a burden of moral
justification in this case lies not only with those in my position, but those in
UM’s as well. UM has long violated the law’s plain command, and that
Grutter lets it do so does not solve the problem, for the Court can be quite
wrong.89 UM therefore has a burden of moral justification as well,
particularly to those in my position. Though I contemplate the action I have
described for the reasons I have given, I am willing, as a Socratic liberal,90
to be talked out of it if that is where the substantive merits of the matter can
be shown to lead.91
Whether or not UM ever accepts my challenge, however, I accept its
challenge.92 I shall argue that my proposed lawlessness is morally
justifiable. Butler speaks of his jurors as engaged in civil disobedience, so
let us turn to the rich literature on civil disobedience for guidance in

_______________________________________________________
88

See Plato, Crito, in The Dialogues of Plato vol. 1, 117, 126 (R.E. Allen, trans., Yale U. Press 1984).
Consider Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, which addressed whether enforcement of a state law
mandating that black and white travelers occupy different railroad cars violated equal protection. Brown
famously overruled Plessy, yet Grutter and Plessy are disturbingly similar for at least three reasons.
First, both rulings are squarely at odds with major relevant legal landmarks of the preceding
fifty years. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1879);
Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Bakke, 438 U.S. 265. Second, notwithstanding the distinction above, both rulings
uphold laws that could be motivated by both benign and invidious intentions. Yet since Justice
O’Connor has accepted that diversity is UM’s actual goal, Barbara Grutter, like Homer Plessy, can be
told that she will reach her destination, just not through the elite public vehicle she could have used had
she been born a different race. Third, while arguments for race based differential treatment by
government can be stronger in domains of state action like law enforcement, corrections, and the
military, bordering the Hobbesian state of nature, Plessy and Grutter uphold such treatment at the core of
civil society, in public accommodations and public education respectively, where Brown and the 1964
Civil Rights Act clearly affirmed racial nondiscrimination.
For these reasons and to this extent, I view Grutter as I would have viewed Plessy a century
ago: not just at risk of being overturned, but deserving such a fate.
90
Since Plato and Xenophon champion Socrates as a moral conservative, this phrase merits a note of
explanation. I emphasize the dimension of Socrates admired by Mill, the father of liberalism: one who,
though having convictions, is liberal insofar as he is always willing to listen and be persuaded, to be
talked out of his convictions. This is because among his convictions is that fundamental ignorance is the
lot of humanity, himself included. See generally John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 19-67 (Currin V. Shields
ed., Liberal Arts Press 1956).
91
If UM can not persuade, then to obey would be to admit that it has no moral case against my
contemplated action.
92
Though I accept this challenge, I reject UM’s moral standing to issue it, i.e., to exhort those in my
position to principled action. Given UM’s long disregard of a rule of law it insists others must follow,
Rawls’s reminder that “[a] person’s right to complain is limited to violations of principles he
acknowledges himself,” Rawls, supra n. 6, at 217, makes the point. Beyond this, UM has flown false
colors throughout the Grutter litigation. As Justice Kennedy suggests, the diversity rationale does not
justify the magnitude of preferences UM extends to members of three races, particularly under strict
scrutiny. See supra n. 81.
Let us thus recall Justice Louis Brandeis’s caution that “[i]f the government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”
Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Perhaps even more to the point is
the old maxim that “because [men] are wicked, and do not observe [their] faith with you, you also do not
have to observe it with them.” Machiavelli, supra n. 5, at 69.
89

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol31/iss2/6

2006]

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

367

examining whether the action I contemplate can be morally justified.
A.

Civil Disobedience

The theory and practice of civil disobedience are ancient.93 It is
often associated with Thoreau94 and, in the twentieth century, with Gandhi,95
King,96 and Rawls.97 As Hall notes:
Commonly listed as absolute requirements of civil
disobedience are such things as (a) the agent’s willingness
to be arrested and punished, (b) the exhaustion of
constitutional means prior to undertaking an act of civl
disobedience, (c) the use of nonviolent methods only, (d)
publication of the act and the agent responsible, and (e) the
moral objection to the law violated. Each of these
characteristics of disobedience is significant from a moral
perspective, . . . but none can be considered absolutely
essential to moral justifiability.98
1. Greenawalt’s Framework
As Hall suggests, there is no single, comprehensive, uncontested
definition of civil disobedience.99 Nonetheless, Professor Kent Greenawalt
has provided a useful test of the moral permissibility of a proposed lawless
act. As he writes:
The major kinds of distinctions drawn among illegal acts by
those who discuss disobedience can be broken into four
broad inquiries: what damage is done to the interests of
others; what is the purpose of disobedience; do the actors
willingly accept punishment; under what form of

_______________________________________________________
93
See e.g. Plato, supra n. 88, at 117; Sophocles, Antigone (Peter Burian & Alan Shapiro eds., Reginald
Gibbons & Charles Segal trans., Oxford U. Press 2003); David Daube, Civil Disobedience in Antiquity
(Edinburgh U. Press 1972); Ernest van den Haag, Political Violence and Civil Disobedience 6-7 (Harper
& Row 1972); Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic 58-59 (1st ed., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
1972).
94
See Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in Walden and Civil Disobedience 224 (Owen Thomas
ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 1966).
95
See e.g. Elliot Zashin, Civil Disobedience and Democracy 149-94 (Free Press 1972); Vinit Haksar,
Civil Disobedience, Threats and Offers: Gandhi and Rawls (Oxford U. Press 1986).
96
See e.g. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in Princeton Readings in Political
Thought 623 (Mitchell Cohen & Nicole Fermon eds., Princeton U. Press 1996); Civil Disobedience in
America: A Documentary History 211-25 (David R. Weber ed., Cornell U. Press 1978); Zashin, supra n.
95 at 149-228.
97
See Rawls, supra n. 6, at 363-91; Civil Disobedience in Focus (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., Routledge
1991).
98
Hall, supra n. 87, at 50. Hall thus argues that only a minimal definition is possible. Id. at 13-17.
99
Bedau agrees that no such definition exists, but notes that “comparable disagreement can be found over
the formal definitions of almost every term central to any body of theory.” Bedau, supra n. 87, at 219.
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government does the disobedience occur.100
These questions, we shall see, encompass most of the traditional
elements of civil disobedience listed by Hall. Greenawalt’s framework thus
seems a workable tool for UM’s interrogation of my proposed course of
action. Based on his criteria, UM might frame four hurdles for me to ascend
in the following order: first, your contemplated act is morally indefensible
since it would be done privately and with no willingness to accept the legal
consequences; secondly, even putting this aside, the U.S. is a constitutional
democracy with lawful channels of reform to which you are morally obliged
to restrict yourself in protesting state action or working for reform you think
desirable; thirdly, even putting this aside, your proposed ends are
inadequate to justify your contemplated action; and finally, even putting this
aside, your proposed means are inadequate to justify your contemplated
action.
I shall address these inquiries individually, incorporating other
authorities and interrogating UM in turn as I proceed.
a.

Your Contemplated Act Is Morally Indefensible Since It
Would Be Done Privately and With No Willingness to
Accept the Legal Consequences.

As Hall suggests, the public character of a proposed lawless act, and
the agent’s willingness to accept its legal consequences, are widely
considered essential to its moral legitimacy.101 UM will thus charge that my
contemplated acts are morally indefensible insofar as my secret distortion of
grades and reference letters would satisfy neither criterion.
I have two replies. First, Dworkin distinguishes persuasive from
coercive civil disobedience,102 and for the present I restrict myself to the
former. Though I do not currently plan to act as I contemplate, simply by
publishing this article I “draw attention to . . . injustice.”103 Though I do not

_______________________________________________________
100
Kent Greenawalt, A Contextual Approach to Disobedience, in Am. Socy. for Political and Leg. Phil.,
Political and Legal Obligation 332, 350 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., Atherton Press
1970).
101
See King, supra n. 96, at 628; Rawls, supra n. 6, at 366; James Luther Adams, Civil Disobedience: Its
Occasions and Limits, in Political and Legal Obligations, supra n. 100, at 293, 297; Greenawalt, supra
n. 100, at 360-63; Edward H. Madden, Civil Disobedience, in Dictionary of the History of Ideas 434, 435
(Philip P. Wiener ed., Charles Scribner’s Sons 1968); Christian Bay, Civil Disobedience, in International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 473, 473-74 (David L. Sills ed., Crowell Collier & Macmillan 1968);
Bedau, supra n. 87, at 218; Bok, supra n. 87, at 92; Abe Fortas, Concerning Dissent and Civil
Disobedience 67-68 (World Publg. Co. 1968). While these are theoretically distinct characteristics of an
act, as a practical matter it is hard to imagine one without the other. That is, one who violates the law
publicly must reasonably expect to be punished, and one who is truly willing to accept punishment would
not keep his disobedience a secret. While Butler terms the jury nullification he advocates civil
disobedience, what he urges, while disobedience, may not be civil.
102
See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 104, 114, 109-10 (Harvard U. Press 1985).
103
Greenawalt, supra n. 100, at 357.
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yet violate Title VI, I hereby protest both UM’s violation of this great law
and Grutter’s blessing of that violation. This alone serves an educative
function, and I give the publication principle its due under the
circumstances.104
Second, and more importantly, Greenawalt notes that “[a]
willingness to accept punishment is not always a condition of a morally
justified act of disobedience.”105 Those who helped fugitive slaves in the
nineteenth century U.S. or smuggled Jews, Gypsies, or Poles out of Europe
during the Holocaust no doubt best illustrate this limiting principle. My
situation, to be sure, is distinct from theirs, yet like them I can neither fairly
nor reasonably be expected to carry out my contemplated action publicly
and with a willingness to accept the legal consequences. To do so, as UM
well knows, would end my job and career.106 Even assuming that UT
administrators oppose what UM is doing, they could hardly be expected to
take the political heat that such publicly announced racial discrimination by
a public university professor in a Southern state would cause.107 The justice
of my actions notwithstanding, I would be terminated forthwith, along with
any chance of moving to another university. To accept the legal
consequences of my contemplated action would be, in Rawls’s words, “to
play into the hands of forces that . . . cannot be trusted.”108
b.

The U.S. is a Constitutional Democracy with Lawful
Channels of Reform to Which You Are Morally Obliged To
Restrict Yourself in Protesting State Action or Working for
Reform You Think Desirable.
As Hall suggests,109 an essentially legitimate political order is a

_______________________________________________________
104
By simply writing about my contemplated action for the time being, rather than carrying it out, I also
stay open to alternatives to lawless action, in this case, lying. See Bok, supra n. 87, at 103.
105
Greenawalt, supra n. 100, at 361. See also Hall, supra n. 87, at 83, 94; Dworkin, supra n. 102, at 114.
If publicity were truly an essential criterion of morally defensible lawlessness, then UM would have to
reject Butler’s thesis. This, we have seen, would put it in a bind.
106
While my penalty would not be a criminal punishment, as theories of civil disobedience often assume,
it would clearly be far more severe than many criminal punishments one could suffer.
107
I could not rationally assume that UT would exercise the discretion that Dworkin enjoins upon
prosecutors in response to some exercises of civil disobedience. See Dworkin, supra n. 102, at 114;
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in Applied Ethics A Multicultural Approach 26, 26-34 (Larry
May & Shari Collins Sharratt eds., Prentice Hall 1994).
108
Rawls, supra n. 6, at 367. Greenawalt’s first inquiry thus discloses that part of what makes my
situation (and that of Butler’s jurors) so compelling is precisely that we can operate undetected, the State
powerless to prevent or punish our lawlessness. UM and I may thus be said to be in a quasi-Rawlsian
situation: though I hold some power over interests it holds dear, it is in effect impotent to exert force
against me, its only tool “uncoerced persuasion.” Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 938 (1994). Dworkin’s forum of principle,
in which “the most fundamental issues of political morality will finally be set out and debated as issues
of principle and not political power alone,” also captures the idea. Dworkin, supra n. 102, at 70.
109
See Hall, supra n. 87 and accompanying text.
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necessary condition for civil disobedience.110 Rawls thus writes that a
theory of civil disobedience presupposes “the special case of a nearly just
society, one that is well-ordered for the most part . . . a more or less just
democratic state . . . .”111 Such a political order, in turn, has been held to
establish a presumptive moral duty to obey the law.112 Justice Abe Fortas
was among the strongest advocates of this view: where the tools of protest,
dissent, criticism, and peaceful assembly are available, lawlessness is
indefensible, especially violation of a law that is not the target of the
protest.113 Since I would concede that such conditions prevail in the U.S.,
UM would claim that my proposed act is morally indefensible, and that I
must limit myself to working for any change I think desirable by lawful
means.114 Such means abound, including writing my Congressman to urge
him to support legislation invalidating Grutter with respect to Title VI,115
publishing advocacy that the Court overturn Grutter at the first
opportunity,116 and contributing to the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative

_______________________________________________________
110
See e.g. Bay, supra n. 101, at 473; Adams, supra n. 101, at 295; Greenawalt, supra n. 100, at 363-68;
Dworkin, supra n. 102, at 105, 110; Bedau, supra n. 87, at 25.
111
Rawls, supra n. 6, at 363.
112
See Plato, supra n. 88, at 50a-53a. As Fortas writes, “each of us is bound to obey the law.” Fortas,
supra n. 101, at 14. See also Bay, supra n. 101, at 476-77, 483; Madden, supra n. 101, at 435; Hall,
supra n. 87, at 62-68. The presumptive moral duty to obey positive law may be thought of as a more
specific version of the duty imposed by the categorical imperative. See Immanuel Kant, The Good Will
and the Categorical Imperative, in The European Philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche 470, 471
(Monroe C. Beardsley ed., Random House 1960). Rawls formulates this idea:

[W]e have a natural duty of civility not to invoke the faults of social arrangements
as a too ready excuse for not complying with them, nor to exploit inevitable
loopholes in the rules to advance our interests. The duty of civility imposes a due
acceptance of the defects of institutions and a certain restraint in taking advantage
of them. Without some recognition of this duty mutual trust and confidence are
liable to break down.
Rawls, supra n. 6, at 355. Admirable as this attempt is, and putting aside the fact that I seek not to
advance my own interests, the vagueness of “due acceptance of the defects of institutions and a certain
restraint in taking advantage of them” renders this an inadequate guide to moral duty in my situation. Id.
113
See Fortas, supra n. 101, at 37-39, 49-50. As he writes, “each individual is bound by all of the laws
under the Constitution. He cannot pick and choose. He cannot substitute his own judgment or passion,
however noble, for the rules of law.” Id. at 55
114
See Dworkin, supra n. 102, at 108-09. As Sissela Bok has suggested, the first duty of those
contemplating deception in a principled way is to seek out alternatives to such deception. See Bok, supra
n. 87, at 103, 143. On the concept of a prima facie duty, see Hall, supra n. 87, at 69, and Joel Feinberg,
Civil Disobedience in the Modern World, in Philosophy of Law 119, 123-24 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman
Gross eds., 4th ed., Wadsworth Publg. Co. 1991).
115
Congress can not void Grutter’s constitutional holding, of course, yet it could effectively reclaim
control of national policy in this area by statutory reversal—redrafting Title VI to clarify that it means
what it plainly says—federal funds shall be denied to any institution practicing racial discrimination.
116
Along these lines, suggests Hall, “it might be considered incumbent upon the agent to have made
some legal protest, or to be making an attempt to use legal means, even at the time he engages in an act
of civil disobedience.” Hall, supra n. 87, at 79. This is a valid point, though one that I have arguably
met. See e.g. Carcieri, supra n. 81; Carcieri, supra n. 87.
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(“MCRI”) campaign.117
My initial reply, as above, is that I do not yet intend to act as I
contemplate. I seek by this article only to speak truth to power, to seize its
attention and make it reconsider its actions, not yet to disrupt those
operations. Yet, assuming that I seriously consider acting as I contemplate,
UM would stress my presumptive duty to obey the law under Greenawalt’s
second inquiry. This would be a powerful claim: as a liberal, I recognize
that the democracy presupposed by civil disobedience could not exist
without presumptive widespread adherence to the rule of law. Further, as
indicated, I think Title VI is a great law, one that should be obeyed.
Nonetheless, several considerations muddy the ethical waters.
To begin, while Congress can void Grutter with regard to Title VI,
it is unlikely to do so any time soon. Republicans control the Congress, of
course, but forcing through a bill clarifying that Title VI means what it says
would give Congressional Democrats a powerful weapon for diminishing
the GOP’s majority in 2006.118 For the foreseeable future then, UM and like
institutions will continue to discriminate in reliance on Grutter. I can take
concrete steps to offset that discrimination, however, and as Hall observes,
“the fact that the law might someday be changed is no remedy because the
individual is required to act before a change could possibly take effect; for
him, legal means are actually exhausted.”119
Second, Butler argues powerfully that the rule of law is a myth, a
sham, an empty vessel that can be used for good or ill.120 Assuming he is
right,121 UM’s exhortation to those in my position is absurd. Like
nullification by the juror to whom Butler writes, the action I contemplate
simply “exposes the indeterminacy of law, but does not create it.”122
Third, even putting this problem aside, and conceding a presumptive
duty to obey the law, the content of the rule of law I am bound to obey is not

_______________________________________________________
117

See supra n 82. As worthy a cause as the MCRI may be, it would affect the law in only one state, and
so the federal government remains the only potential source of widespread reform in the near future.
118
Indeed, this is a midterm election, in which the President’s party typically loses congressional seats.
See Roger H. Davidson & Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and its Members 103 (CQ Press 2004).
Moreover, Congressional Republicans may have cost themselves some political capital with the
enactment of the Terry Schiavo law. See Daniel Eisenberg, Lessons of the Schiavo Battle, Time Mag. 22,
23, 27 (Apr. 4, 2005). If so, it seems unlikely they will risk further political capital any time soon in such
a volatile area of policy.
119
Hall, supra n. 87, at 78. As Thoreau expressed the idea, “as for adopting the ways which the State has
provided for remedying the evil, I know not of such ways. They take too much time, and a man’s life
will be gone. I have other affairs to attend to.” Thoreau, supra n. 94, at 231-32.
120
Butler, supra n. 27, at 706-08.
121
Critical legal theory has long pressed this claim. As Hutchinson has written, for example, “[f]or CLS,
the Rule of Law is a mask that lends to existing social structures the appearance of legitimacy and
inevitability.” Allan Hutchinson, Critical Legal Studies 3 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1989). See
also Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, supra n. 23, at xv.
122
Butler, supra n. 27, at 708.
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clear. If it is the racial discrimination for good reasons rule announced in
Grutter, I would be following the law and thus engaging in no civil
disobedience requiring moral justification. Conversely, if it is the racial
nondiscrimination rule plainly commanded by Title VI, UM’s long
disregard of this rule undermines its standing to hold it up as a standard I am
bound to obey.
UM might reply: the Court has granted us, not you, permission to
discriminate. Since our ability to assemble a racially diverse class depends
on those in your position grading and writing references without bias
against the three minorities, you are morally obliged to cooperate with our
efforts.123 Unfortunately, as we have seen, to the extent that Grutter departs
from Bakke,124 and thus can not be reconciled with Title VI even as Justice
Powell characterized it, Grutter itself undermines the rule of law. To that
extent it embodies nothing with which I am morally bound to cooperate.
Again, however, let us put these problems aside, and for the reasons
above concede a presumptive moral duty of fidelity to positive law. The
question again becomes whether the presumption can be overcome, and as it
happens, Greenawalt’s final two inquiries suggest the use of a wellestablished tool of constitutional analysis to determine whether this is the
case. The Court has long used a means/ends test to determine the
constitutionality of challenged laws. Where ends concern purpose or intent
behind state action, means are concerned in large part with the effects of that
action.
For a long time, where state action has either burdened a
fundamental interest or employed a suspect classification like race, the
Court has used the highest, most skeptical level of scrutiny.125 I have
suggested that Grutter abandoned this test of strict scrutiny, and on this
account will be overturned in due course. Nonetheless, since I am a state
actor seeking to justify racial discrimination on moral grounds, and since I
have accepted UM’s challenge, I am willing to subject my proposed action
to strict scrutiny.126 If my ends are compelling, then, and my means

_______________________________________________________
123
I assume that UM would claim that I am bound to the rule of racial nondiscrimination. Any claim that
I am bound to discriminate in favor of members of the three races is the subject of another article.
124
See supra nn. 78-82.
125
Until Grutter, as noted above, strict scrutiny meant an uphill battle. See supra n 77. As argued above,
Grutter’s abandonment of strict scrutiny of racial classifications is one of many reasons the ruling should
be overturned. See supra n. 77.and accompanying text.
126
At least as strict as that employed in Grutter. Let us recall, further, that in their Bakke concurrence,
Justices William Brennan, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun favored the use of
mere intermediate scrutiny of racial discrimination practiced by public university officials bound by Title
VI and the Fourteenth Amendment so long as that discrimination is “benign.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 35862. Thus, according to those who favor racial discrimination by public universities, I need only show
that my proposed distortions are substantially related to an important interest. See e.g. Miss. U. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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narrowly tailored to advance those ends, my actions will be justified in both
moral and constitutional terms.
c.

Your Proposed Ends Are Inadequate To Justify Your
Contemplated Action.

Bok writes that there are many excuses for lying, like avoiding
harm, producing benefits, and promoting fairness, but what is needed is a
justification for lying.127 At the outset, then, UM would say that since my
contemplated acts would be secret, they can not be justified as symbolic,
educative, or exemplary.128 I concede these points, yet reiterate that this
article, a lawful means of dissent, may serve other functions, like protesting
Grutter’s departure from the rules of constitutional and statutory law.
Moreover, my contemplated action would be neither revolutionary,129
anarchistic,130 nor self-interested.131
We thus come to the crux of Greenawalt’s purpose inquiry.
Dworkin identifies three types of civil disobedience—policy-based,
integrity-based, and justice-based132—and submit that my contemplated acts
would find support in all three bases, though especially the last.
The first, Dworkin notes, is not based on principle, but, policy. He
writes that people engage in policy-based civil disobedience “because they
believe the program they oppose is . . . very unwise, stupid, and dangerous
for the majority as well as any minority.”133 In Bakke, Justice Powell
described the policy implications of racial discrimination being “[d]isparate
constitutional tolerance of [racial and ethnic] classifications well may serve
to exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate them.”134
All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and
benefits on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with
deep resentment by the individuals burdened. The denial to

_______________________________________________________
127

Bok, supra n. 87, at 89-103.
See Bedau, supra n. 87, at 20-21.
129
See Hall, supra n. 87, at 20.
130
See Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics 38 (Yale U. Press 1989). Thoreau toys with anarchism,
boldly asserting that “the objections which have been brought against a standing army, and they are many
and weighty, and deserve to prevail, may also at last be brought against a standing government.”
Thoreau, supra n. 94, at 224.
131
“[I]t goes without saying that civil disobedience cannot be grounded solely on group or self interest.”
Rawls, supra n. 6, at 365. As Greenawalt adds, “most illegal acts are committed by persons pursuing
their own interests at the expense of others; these actors would not usually advance a moral justification
for what they do.” Greenawalt, supra n. 100, at 356. While my contemplated acts may affect others’
chances of selective law school admission, I attended law school long ago, and so have no personal
interest or stake in the result of those acts. As Bok thus observes of altruistic lies, “lies are . . . believed
better if they help—or avoid harm to—others rather than oneself.” Bok, supra n. 87, at 80.
132
See Dworkin, supra n. 102, at 106-13.
133
Id. at 107.
134
438 U.S. at 298-99.
128
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innocent persons of equal rights and opportunities may
outrage those so deprived and therefore may be perceived as
invidious. These individuals are likely to find little comfort
in the notion that the deprivation they are asked to endure is
merely the price of membership in the dominant majority
and that its imposition is inspired by the supposedly benign
purpose of aiding others. One should not lightly dismiss the
inherent unfairness of, and the perception of mistreatment
that accompanies, a system of allocating benefits and
privileges on the basis of skin color and ethnic origin.135
As for integrity-based and justice-based disobedience, Dworkin
observes that these “involve, though in different ways, convictions of
principle.”136 Integrity-based disobedience occurs “when the law requires
people to do what their conscience absolutely forbids.”137 In race-based jury
nullification, we saw, “the jury votes its conscience,”138 and my
contemplated acts, like theirs, would be based on conscience. This would be
so since to do otherwise, in my view, would be to cooperate with injustice,
suggesting that integrity-based and justice-based disobedience are
intertwined in this case. Justice-based disobedience, naturally, is done “to
oppose and reverse a program [one] believe[s] unjust.”139 As Butler writes,
“there still is no moral obligation to follow an unjust law.”140 We are
obliged “to serve a higher calling than law: justice.”141 As Rawls adds, “[i]n
justifying civil disobedience . . . one invokes the commonly shared
conception of justice that underlies the political order.”142

_______________________________________________________
135
Id. at 295 n. 34. Reiterating this danger, Justice Kennedy observed that “[i]f universities are given the
latitude to administer programs that are tantamount to quotas, . . . [t]he unhappy consequence will be to
perpetuate the hostilities that proper consideration of race is designed to avoid.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). As Justice Brandeis reminded us long ago, “[i]f the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.” Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
136
Dworkin, supra n. 102, at 107. As Bentham famously wrote, “[w]hat one expects to find in a
principle is something that points out some external consideration” for one’s actions. Bentham, supra n.
39, at 25. See also Bok, supra n. 87, at 90-92. As Thoreau adds, “[a]ction from principle, the perception
and the performance of right, changes things and relations; it is essentially revolutionary.” Thoreau,
supra n. 94, at 230-31.
137
Dworkin, supra n. 102, at 108 (emphasis added). Rawls includes conscientiousness as an essential
attribute of civil disobedience. See Rawls, supra n. 6, at 364. Zashin notes that moral autonomy is a key
aspect of civil disobedience grounded in liberal democracy. See Zashin, supra n. 95, at ch. 2. As
Thoreau weighs in, “[m]ust the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to
the legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then?” Thoreau, supra n. 94, at 225.
138
Butler, supra n. 27, at 700 (emphasis added). As he writes, “the black juror has two choices: She can
vote for conviction . . . or she can vote ‘not guilty’ . . . . In choosing the latter, the juror makes a decision
not to be a passive symbol of support for a system for which she has no respect.” Id. at 714.
139
Dworkin, supra n. 102, at 107.
140
Butler, supra n. 27, at 708.
141
Id. at 723. On the distinction between promoting justice and opposing injustice, see Feinberg, supra
n. 114, at 124; Bedau, supra n. 87, at 23.
142
Rawls, supra n. 6, at 365.
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This, then, is precisely what I am doing. Within a liberal political
order, Justice Powell reminded us in Bakke, justice consists fundamentally
in a fair process to each individual.143 The primary goal of those in my
position acting as I have proposed would be literally to adjust the law school
admissions process. Standing on the principle of racial nondiscrimination,
we seek to level the playing field so as to maximize the number of
individuals who receive fair144 consideration for the scarce, valuable public
resources each rationally seeks. Indeed, though Butler argues that my duty
to justice outweighs my duty to law, my contemplated action would fulfill
my moral duties to both justice and law. In acting to offset the effects of
others’ lawlessness, I advance the underlying goal of a just law.145
UM might reply that justice in this case must be understood not in
the attempt to influence a vast process, but in doing equity—particular
justice.146 John, Amy, and Mike have done nothing to deserve having UM’s
actions taken out on them. It is UM, not they, that has been shown to
discriminate. They are innocent of that policy, and are due an assessment
based on an honest estimation of their individual merits. Otherwise, UM
might claim, I not only deny them due process of law, but I fail to heed the
deeper Socratic injunction to “give to each what is owed to him.”147 As
compelling as this may be, I cannot responsibly blind myself to the larger
picture. After Grutter, race will continue to play the dominant role in the
admissions process we have seen. My duty of fairness toward my non-

_______________________________________________________
143

As Justice Powell wrote, “[f]airness in individual competition for opportunities, especially those
provided by the State, is a widely cherished American ethic. Indeed, in a broader sense, an underlying
assumption of the rule of law is the worthiness of a system of justice based on fairness to the individual.”
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 n. 53. See also Edward S. Greenberg, The American Political System: A Radical
Approach 22-23 (4th ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1986). On process theory generally, see John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard U. Press 1980).
144
With Bok, I am using justice and fairness synonymously, attempting to capture what Aristotle was
after in speaking of the just as rectifying what is disproportionate or wrong, distributing fairly. See
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 1130 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Publg. Co. 1985); Bok, supra n. 87,
at 81. Like the jurors to whom Butler writes, I am to “give to each what is owed to him.” Plato,
Republic 6 (C. D. C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publg. Co. 2004). Indeed, if those jurors can decree a
substantive outcome, I can surely take measures designed, and in some cases likely, to perfect the
process by which scarce, valuable public and private resources are allocated. In Thoreau’s words, “[i]f
the injustice . . . is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say,
break the law.” Thoreau, supra n. 94, at 231.
145
In so doing, I honor Hall’s important proviso that even where one moral duty overcomes another, the
latter must still be honored to the extent possible. See Hall, supra n. 87, at 70-71.
146
See supra n. 36.
147
See Plato, supra n. 144, at 6. This formulation has been criticized as an inadequate guide to ethical
conduct, beginning with Plato himself. Id. at 6-12. While admittedly it does not yield ethical solutions
with mathematical precision, that is too much to expect from applied ethics. I submit that in situations
calling for practical judgments like those involved in assigning fair course grades and writing
conscientious references, it is a powerful guiding principle that at least often places workable outer limits
on our conduct. I shall let my assessments of John, Amy, and Mike, supra, serve as examples of
conscientious attempts to do justice under the guidance of this principle.

Published by eCommons, 2005

376

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

minority students thus enters the calculus,148 justifying the race-based
distortions I contemplate. I thus conclude that my purposes are compelling,
satisfying both the ends phase of strict scrutiny and Greenawalt’s third
inquiry.
d.

Your Proposed Means Are Inadequate To Justify Your
Contemplated Action.

As Bedau notes, even one who proposes to act lawlessly in the name
of justice must show that his act is the proper response to injustice.149
Greenawalt’s final inquiry thus concerns means, i.e., whether a
contemplated act would “interfere with the legitimate interests of
other[s].”150 This is an important consideration, yet I have two replies.
First, my proposed means are nonviolent, thus satisfying perhaps the
most common criterion for the moral legitimacy of lawless action.151
Second, my means are justly tempered: just as jurors, using Butler’s
principled framework,152 would exercise discretion and restraint, not license,
I would act in a way that, if generalized, would offset only the kind and
degree of racial distortion reflected in the key LSAT/GPA cells at prominent
law schools.153
To illustrate, we saw that Judge Boggs observed that race is worth a
full grade point in the UM Law School admissions process where applicants

_______________________________________________________
148
While the UM admissions committee will read their applications, I am on the ground working with
these students every day. I know that many of them dream of admission to prominent law schools. See
U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 520, 552-53 (1996) (recognizing the compelling role that a university’s
reputation and alumni connections legitimately play in the desirability of admission for any applicant). I
also know that some of them have worked hard enough to be short listed at major law schools, yet I know
the difference race can make in whether they are accepted or rejected. Finally, I know that many
students among UM’s preferred races hail from higher socioeconomic backgrounds than many white
students, and not from inner city Detroit. As recently noted, “[m]ost beneficiaries of affirmative action
are middle-income. According to a study by . . . the Educational Testing Service . . . [o]nly 3 percent of
the students at [the 146 most prestigious colleges and universities] come from the bottom 25 percent of
the socioeconomic scale.” Steven A. Holmes & Greg Winter, Ideas and Trends: Test of Time; Fixing the
Race Gap in 25 Years or Less, N.Y. Times D1 (June 29, 2003). For these reasons, my duty of equity to
my non-minority students is profound.
149
See Bedau, supra n. 87, at 23; see also Hall, supra n. 87, at 97.
150
See Greenawalt, supra n. 100, at 350.
151
See e.g. Madden, supra n. 101, at 435, 438; Rawls, supra n. 6, at 364; Bay, supra n. 101, at 478;
Fortas, supra n. 101, at 60; Hall, supra n. 87, at 87 n. 14; Bedau, supra n. 87, at 218. Not all definitions
include it, however. See e.g. Gerald C. McCallum, Jr., Some Truths and Untruths about Civil
Disobedience, in Political and Legal Obligations, supra n. 100, at 370, 371; Hall, supra n. 87, 88-90.
152
See Butler, supra n. 27.
153
See supra n. 84. In this sense, I satisfy Hall’s concern that I have chosen the least serious illegal act I
can justify. See Hall, supra n. 87, at 80. In passing, while I hardly face what Gandhi faced, we can now
see that my proposed action may accurately be described as he described his own, as nonviolent noncooperation with injustice. After all, nonviolent non-cooperation in my situation could not possibly
consist of refusing to write reference letters and assign grades. My action may also be characterized as
nonviolent direct action. See Civil Disobedience in America: A Documentary History, supra n. 96, at
219.
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are otherwise equally qualified.154 In grading, accordingly, acting only to
offset that advantage, I would assign every non-minority a final grade half a
grade higher than he has actually earned, and every minority a final grade
half a grade lower than he has actually earned. In a given class, then, if two
students, one white and one black, both earn B+’s (a 3.5 GPA at UT) on the
merits regardless of race, the white would receive an A and the black a B. If
they both earn B’s, the white would receive a B+, the black would receive a
C+, and so on. Such distortions would constitute a measured, appropriate
response to UM’s discrimination. They would simply level the playing field
without destroying the prospects of minority applicants.
As for reference letters, naturally, the adjustments appropriate to
offset UM’s racial discrimination will depend on the facts of each student.
A single example of an adjustment that can easily be made arises in the
choice of the reference letter’s final adverb, that modifying the verb
recommend. By using enthusiastically, very highly, highly, or no adverb at
all, I would simply seek, in the good faith on which a liberal social order
depends, to make the appropriate adjustment to the best of my ability. My
means are thus measured and moderate155—narrowly tailored to advancing
my goal of a just, level playing field.
UM might respond that such alleged moderation does not fully
establish that my means are a close fit with my ends. The grades I assign
and the references I write will likely be relied on by decision makers other
than those whom I quite justifiably assume are engaging in racial
discrimination. Regardless of my allegedly just purposes, UM would claim
that the concrete effect of my contemplated action could in many cases be
manifestly unfair to minority students like John, Amy and Mike. I have two
replies.
First, this objection is much weaker with respect to law school
reference letters than with respect to grades. Such letters will usually be
relied upon only by law school admissions committees, all of which will be
seeking minority students. Secondly, even with respect to grades, where
concededly my distortions could impact John, Amy and Mike for years to
come, it is UM that has undertaken for decades to discriminate in violation
of the plain command of Title VI. As above, it has no standing to complain
that others are taking measures to offset that racial discrimination. If my
minority students’ interests are damaged as a result, UM is as blameworthy

_______________________________________________________
154

See supra n. 85 and accompanying text.

155
As Aristotle wrote, moral virtue consists in moderation, a mean. See Aristotle, supra n. 144, at 33147. Thus, my means are as pure as my ends. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Three Statements on Civil
Disobedience (1961-1968), in Civil Disobedience in America: A Documentary History, supra n. 96, at
211.
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as anyone.156 As Rawls writes:
[I]f justified civil disobedience seems to threaten civic
concord, the responsibility falls not upon those who protest
but upon those whose abuse of authority and power justifies
such opposition. For to employ the coercive apparatus of
the state in order to maintain manifestly unjust institutions
is itself a form of illegitimate force that men in due course
have a right to resist.157
As Dworkin thus sums up the rule, anticipating my dilemma with
uncanny precision:
If someone believes that a particular official program is
deeply unjust, if the political process offers no realistic hope
of reversing that program soon, if there is no possibility of
effective persuasive civil disobedience, if nonviolent
nonpersuasive techniques are available that hold out a
reasonable prospect of success, if these techniques do not
threaten to be counterproductive, then that person does the
right thing, given his convictions, to use those
nonpersuasive means.158
Since my purposes are compelling and my proposed means nonviolent, tempered, and a measured fit with my purposes, I submit that my
contemplated action withstands strict scrutiny, and is thus morally justified
under Greenawalt’s framework.159
V.

CONCLUSION

I have applied Professor Kent Greenawalt’s test of the moral
permissibility of civil disobedience to the actions I have proposed. While I
have concluded that those actions are morally justifiable, this only
establishes what I may do, not what I must do. Moral permission does not
establish moral duty, and while I can justify discriminating for the reasons
given, I can also justify not discriminating for the reasons given.160 Some
have argued that where alternative courses of action can be justified, no
moral formula can relieve us of the responsibility simply to choose what we

_______________________________________________________
156

This seems analogous to President Bush taunting Senator Kerry in the recent Presidential election over
his alleged inconsistency over a war that Bush started.
157
Rawls, supra n. 6, at 390-91.
158
Dworkin, supra n. 102, at 110.
159
I believe my actions are also justified under the criteria presented by Hall, supra n. 87, at 100-02,
Zashin, supra n. 95, at 144, Bok, supra n. 87, at 92, 97-98, and King, supra n. 155 at 221 (except for
willingness to accept consequences). Though it would require another article to make the case, I submit
that my contemplated actions could also be justified under both a deontological approach like Kant’s
categorical imperative, and a consequentialist, utility-based approach.
160
See supra § II.A.
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shall do and to live with our choices.161
I have argued that UM lacks any moral authority to exhort those in
my position to honor the nondiscrimination principle at the heart of Title VI.
Its position reduces to do as we say, not as we do. In Butler’s words, the
representative black juror “holds no confidence in the integrity of the
criminal justice system. . . . It would be farcical for her to be the sole
colorblind actor in the criminal process [and she] should approach [her]
work cognizant of its political nature.”162 Given my reasons for thinking
Grutter neither legitimate nor durable, then, and my justified lack of
confidence in the integrity of the law school admissions process, it would
likewise seem farcical for me to be the sole colorblind actor in the law
school admissions process.
Yet, for now I choose not to do as UM does, for the following
reason. While I cannot know the effects of discriminating, I can know at
least part of the effects of not discriminating. If I discriminate, it may very
well determine in some close cases which law schools admit whom, yet I
can never know when or even if this occurs. I am, after all, not privy to the
decision-making processes at those institutions. In contrast, by judging
minority students on their individual merits regardless of race, and providing
them copies of their reference letters, I can be certain that they have at least
one concrete instance of proof that our society is not simply, hopelessly
racist. For the rest of their lives, regardless of sweeping claims to the
contrary, they will know that they can never honestly lapse into the mindless
assumption that all and only those of certain races are simply, hopelessly
racist. In conscience, they will never be able to take that convenient
shortcut to thinking. They would have to lie to themselves in order to do
so.163
For now, then, I choose not to do as UM does. UM can continue to
discriminate, even while some on whose nondiscrimination it depends
refuse to retaliate. Events may overtake us in any case. Not only is Grutter
vulnerable to being overruled,164 as we have seen, but the MCRI has now

_______________________________________________________
161

See W.T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy: Kant to Wittgenstein and Sartre 442-43 (2d ed.,
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1969); Bay, supra n. 101, at 478-79, 486; Camus, The Rebel (Anthony
Bower trans., N.Y. Knopf 1969).
162
Butler, supra n. 27, at 714-15.
163
This effect extends in some cases to grades, not just reference letters. To illustrate, Mike knows that
his improvement from a C+ to an A in one semester cannot possibly be explained by the theory that our
society is simply, fundamentally racist. Indeed, it can only be explained by the opposing hypothesis:
there are non-minorities in positions of some authority who, with the power to do otherwise, put race
aside and judge individuals on their merits. When he slipped to a B+ the next semester, Mike knew it
could not have been simply due to his race, and thus that it made sense to work that much harder the next
semester, which in fact paid off. Whatever else he is ever told, then, Mike knows that things are not as
simple as critical race theory decrees.
164
See supra nn. 75-85 and accompanying text.
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been approved for placement on the 2006 Michigan ballot, and polls show
that Michigan voters favor the MCRI.165 A symbolic defeat for racial
discrimination in public university admissions may be at hand. In the
meantime, UM and like institutions are exposed as freeriders, political
parasites who depend on others not to do as they do. If American race
relations are to continue the progress they have shown since Brown, I assert
that it will be not because of, but rather in spite of, actions like those at UM.

_______________________________________________________
165

See supra n. 82.
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